

Message Text

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TAGS: PARM, US, UR

SUBJECT: TTBR/PNE NEGOTIATIONS - NORDYKE STATEMENT AT PLENARY
MEETING 1/30/76

TTBT/PNE DELEGATION MESSAGE NO. 9.

1. FOLLOWING IS NORDYKE STATEMENT ON SLIFERS GIVEN AT PLENARY
MEETING, JANUARY 30, 1976.

BEGIN TEXT:

DURING THE RECENT BREAK WE HAVE GIVEN THE SUBJECT OF THE PLACEMENT
OF THE YIELD-MEASURING EQUIPMENT CONSIDERABLY MORE THOUGHT. WE
STILL CONCLUDE THAT THE SPACING RULES SUGGESTED BY THE SOVIET
SIDE WOULD NOT MEET THE AGREED PROVISION THAT THE DATA TO BE
USED FOR YIELD DETERMINATION MUST BE OBTAINED FROM WITHIN THE
HYDRODYNAMIC ZONE SURROUNDING EACH EXPLOSION. SPECIFICALLY, FOR
YIELDS BELOW ABOUT 75 KILOTONS, IN HIGH VELOCITY MEDIA,
OBSERVANCE OF THE FIVE-METER STAND-OFF SUGGESTED BY THE SOVIET
SIDE WOULD MEAN THAT, FOR A TEN-METER EXPLOSIVE CANISTER, NO
PORTION OF THE YIELD-MEASURING EQUIPMENT WOULD BE LOCATED
WITHIN THE HYDRODYNAMIC ZONE.

OUR STUDY OF THIS SUBJECT ALSO PROMPTED SEVERAL QUESTIONS REGARDING
THE TEXT IN PARAGRAPH 9 OF THE SECOND SOVIET PROCEDURES

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DOCUMENT. THIS TEXT CONTAINS A PROVISION THAT WOULD LIMIT THE

END OF THE YIELD-MEASUREING EQUIPMENT TO A DISTANCE NOT LESS THAN FIVE METERS FROM THE TOP OF THE EXPLOSIVE CANISTER, WITHOUT ANY RESTRICTION ON THE LENGTH OF THE EXPLOSIVE CANISTER. IN THE NEXT SENTENCE, IT IS SPECIFIED THAT, FOR EXPLOSIVE CANISTERS LONGER THAN TEN METERS, ADDITIONAL SLIFERS WILL BE EMPLACED WITH THE ONLY RESTRICTION BEING THAT THEY SHOULD BE POSITIONED ABOVE THE LOWE TEN METERS OF THE CANISTER. THIS LATER PROVISION WOULD THUS APPEAR TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE FIVE-METER STAND-OFF CONTAINED IN THE FORMER AND LEADS TO THE QUESTION: SPECIFICALLY, HOW DOES THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSE TO EMLACE THE YIELD-MEASURING EQUIPMENT FOR CANISTERS LONGER THAN TEN METERS? DOES THE FIVE-METER STAND-OFF APPLY TO ALL CANISTERS, REGARDLESS OF LENGTH, OR ONLY TO CANISTERS LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO TEN METERS IN LENGTH?

THE SOVIET SIDE HAS ALSO PROPOSED THE USE OF AN INSTRUMENT HOLE FOR EMLACEMENT OF THE YIELD-MEASURING EQUIPMENT, AT THE CHOICE OF THE CONDUCTING SIDE, WHENEVER A CANISTER IS LONGER THAN TEN METERS. IT IS PROPOSED THAT SUCH A HOLE BE SPACED 1.5 METERS TIMES THE CUBE ROOT OF THE YIELD FROM THE EMLACEMENT POINT. AS WE HAVE STATED BEFORE, SUCH A PROCEDURE IS THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE BUT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO REALIZE IN PRACTICE. FOR EXAMPLE, FOR A 40-KILOTON EXPLOSION, THIS WOULD MEAN PLACING THE INSTRUMENT HOLE ABOUT FIVE METERS FROM THE EMLACEMENT POINT WITH AN ACCURACY OF AT LEAST A METER. AT A DEPTH OF 1,000 METERS, THIS WOULD REQUIRE AN ACCURACY OF BETTER THAN 0.1 PERCENT IN SURVEYING BOTH HOLES AND IN DRILLING OF THE INSTRUMENT HOLE. OUR EXPERIENCE IS THAT ATTAINING SUCH ACCURACIES AT SUCH DEPTHS IS VERY DIFFICULT, EXPENSIVE, AND TIME-CONSUMING. EXPLOSIONS AT GREATER DEPTHS WOULD REQUIRE EVEN MORE DEMANDING ACCURACY. IN ADDITION TO THE PROBLEMS OF SURVEYING, ATTEMPTING TO DRILL ONE HOLE SO CLOSE TO A SECOND HOLE RUNS THE RISK OF ESTABLISHING COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE TWO HOLES WITH THE RESULT THAT THE ABILITY TO CIRCULATE DRILLING FLUID IS LOST AND THERE IS A VERY GREAT POSSIBILITY OF COLLAPSING THE SECOND HOLE.

DURING THE LAST ROUND, WE BRIEFLY DESCRIBED SEVERAL ELECTRONIC TECHNIQUES WHICH WE BELIEVE COULD BE USED TO PREVENT ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION OTHER THAN THAT REQUIRED FOR YIELD VERIFICATION. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT ONE OF THESE TECHNIQUES COULD BE USED AND WE PROPOSE THAT THESE APPROACHES BE DISCUSSED IN MORE DETAIL.

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WE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THESE PROBLEMS WITH YOU IMMEDIATELY IN THE INTERESTS OF EXPEDITING OUR PROGRESS. END TEXT.
STOESSEL

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